74. Race to the Mountains


With their position growing worse by the day, Afranius and Petreius decide to make a run for it and attempt to march to Celtiberia where they expect to find support. For Julius Caesar, everything depends on stopping them from reaching a set of mountains/hills at which point they will be out of his reach and the war will become protracted. And so the race begins, with both armies rushing to reach the mountain pass first. Along the way, Caesar's soldiers become fed up with his famous clemency and aren't shy in letting him know.
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Show Summary:
The March of History is a biographical history podcast on Julius Caesar and the fall of the Roman Republic. Not only does it cover Julius Caesar's life in depth, it also explores the intricate world of ancient Rome and all of the key players of the late Roman Republic including Cicero, Pompey, Crassus, Cato, Clodius, Mark Antony, Brutus, a young Augustus (Octavian), Marius, Sulla and (though not Roman) Cleopatra.
I'm sure all of you know what Audible is, but in case you don't, Audible offers a library of audiobooks read by professional narrators, and I think any listener of the March of History would probably enjoy listening to audiobooks, too. As a suggestion, I'd say try using your free audio credit to listen to Say Nothing, a true story of murder and memory in Northern Ireland by Patrick Radden Keefe. I've read this book myself, and it's a page-turner to say the least. The book tells the story of the troubles in Northern Ireland through the lens of one particular murder mystery, that of Jean McConville, a mother of ten living in Belfast. The book is both riveting and educational, and it's a New York Times bestseller to boot.
So that would be my recommendation, or a recommendation, but you can use your credit to listen to whatever book you like, fiction or nonfiction. So remember, visit audibletrial.com slash Caesar. That's audibletrial.com slash, and Caesar is spelled C-A-E-S-A-R. I know some people spell it C-E-S-A-R, but no, the real Caesar is C-A-E-S-A-R. Or just look in the show notes. There's a link right there.
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Welcome to Episode 74 of the March of History. I'm your host, Trevor Fernes. We left off in our last episode with momentum in the Spanish campaign rapidly shifting.
Caesar now has a bridge over the Sicoris River. This means he now has access to food from the Gallic convoys, from his allies, and from his own foraging parties. And of course, the Gallic convoys brought additional cavalry with them. Caesar's Gallic cavalry then took the Pompeian foragers by surprise and crushed a cohort of Spanish Light Infantry. And that is where we pick back up with our story today.
Caesar tells us the Pompeians were shaken by the bravery of the Gallic cavalry. And after that defeat, their foraging expeditions went out with much less confidence. Many times, they go out only a short distance from their camp so that they can quickly flee back to the front. And other times, they take long, circuitous routes in an attempt to avoid Caesar's cavalry.
And regardless of what tactic they employ in foraging, the second they have any kind of setback, or the second they spot Caesar's cavalry, they drop the supplies they're carrying and just run. Very soon, they become so fearful that they begin to only send out foraging parties at night, and these, and these, only at intervals of several days. Caesar points out that sending foragers out at night like this was contrary to all custom. Meaning, this really is unusual behavior and is therefore a sign of how shaken the Pompeians are.
And of course, there was the naval victory at Massilia. This too has bolstered Caesar's cause. After all, it isn't just the two opposing Roman armies that have heard this news. It has spread to all the surrounding Spanish tribes. In fact, Cassius Dio tells us Caesar announced this victory with so much intentional exaggeration to the Spaniards that they began to defect to Caesar.
Caesar doesn't mention exaggerating this victory, but he does tell us that Spanish tribes started coming over to him in droves. He tells us the Osca and the Calagurris sent him envoys promising to obey his commands. Soon, the people of the city of Tarraco and the Lacetani and Ausetani tribes also promised to obey his commands.
A few days after that, the Illurgavonenses, who live along the Ebro River, join his side. Apparently, there were Illurgavonenses currently serving with Afranius and Petreius at this time. When these men hear that their tribe has declared for Caesar, a cohort of them defects to Caesar's side.
Caesar tells all these new allied tribes to gather food and send it to him, which they do. Now, if all this wasn't alarming and disheartening enough for Afranius and Petreius and their men, they now learn that the rumors of Pompey approaching from North Africa are false. There is no one coming to save them. They won't be able to rely on their great general for help.
Caesar writes in the Civil War commentaries about this rapid change of fortune and the effects it had on his enemies,
“The whole situation had changed rapidly; the bridge was complete, five important peoples had opened friendly relations, the problem of the corn supply had been settled, and further, as the rumours about auxiliaries of the legions said to be coming with Pompey through Mauretania exploded, many of the more distant tribes defected from Afranius and made friendly overtures to Caesar. All of this thoroughly frightened Caesar's opponents.”
Now, things are moving in Caesar's direction, but he does still have one big thorn in his side. Yes, he now has a bridge over the Sicoris. But that bridge is 20 miles upriver, or about 33 kilometers. Remember, to build this bridge, they had to tow their boats at night far upriver to avoid being seen by the Pompeians. So, yes, it serves its purpose, but it's not at all convenient. In fact, it puts Caesar at a disadvantage relative to the Pompeians, since the Pompeians' bridge is right next to their camp, near Ilderda.
So, to resolve this issue, Caesar sets his men to creating an artificial ford near to his camp. Just so we're all on the same page, a ford is a shallow point in a river where a crossing can be made. So, to do this, he sets his men to dig several trenches or canals along the river, 30 feet wide, in order to divert the river. He keeps his soldiers at this task day and night.
Meanwhile, Afranius and Petreius are watching all of this happen. There was already a jumpy, defeatist atmosphere in their camp. Remember, according to Caesar, all they needed was to see his cavalry, or to get into any kind of trouble and they drop all their supplies and run back to camp. And that was before they started seeing Caesar's men digging canals to divert the river, day and night.
As they watch this construction project progress, it begins to dawn on Afranius and Petreius what kind of position they will be in when Caesar finishes this ford. Their supply of food is already being throttled by Caesar's cavalry, and that's despite the huge detour they have to take to cross the river. When Caesar gets this ford set up, the cavalry will be able to cross right near Ilerda and therefore right near to the Pompeian camp.
At that point, it's quite possible that Caesar will be able to cut their army off from food altogether. So, with this sort of fear mounting, Afranius and Petreius decide to abandon this theater of war and flee to Celtiberia, the land of the Celtiberians. Caesar tells us they had a few additional reasons for wanting to move the war here.
For one, Caesar's name was less well known among the Celtiberians. Caesar also tells us that the Celtiberians could be divided into two groups. The first were those who had supported Quintus Sertorius in his civil war in Spain against Sulla's faction. Caesar tells us that Pompey had defeated and conquered these tribes in that war, and that ever since then, they had remained in awe of the name and authority of Pompey, even in his absence.
The second group was made up of those tribes that had supported Pompey in the Sertorian war. Pompey had bestowed great rewards on this second group, and so Caesar tells us they were devoted to him. So, simply put, both groups are strongly in favor of Pompey, and Afranius and Petreius expect to be able to raise additional cavalry and auxiliaries among these tribes.
With this plan set, Afranius and Petreius start preparing the way ahead of them. Their route will take them south, where they will have to cross over the Ebro River. So, Afranius and Petreius have some advanced contingents of their men start to gather boats from along the Ebro. They concentrate these boats at the town of Octogesa, which is about 30 miles from their camp near Ilerda. There, they build a pontoon bridge over the Ebro, using these boats. With their escape route now prepared, Afranius and Petreius send two legions over the stone bridge at Ilerda to secure themselves a position on the eastern bank. These two legions duly cross this course and build a second camp, a sort of beachhead on the eastern bank.
Now, flashback to Caesar, and, of course, he is not ignorant of all these escape plans by Afranius and Petreius. Caesar has scouts who report to him on the construction of the pontoon bridge over the Ebro. So, he knows it's now a race against the clock to get this ford completed.
And by a strange twist of fate, or maybe we should attribute it to Caesar's returning luck, Caesar's ford reaches the point at which it is usable by his cavalry on the same day the pontoon bridge over the Ebro is complete. Caesar immediately sends some of his cavalry across the ford. He tells us they were able to cross, but with difficulty.
This lights a fire under Afranius and Petreius, and that night, they march the rest of their army to the eastern bank of this course, save for two cohorts of auxiliaries. These two cohorts are left to guard Ilerda. And what a job. I don't know what the plan for these guys was, but I imagine with the main army marching away to escape being cut off from food and leaving you and a small group of men behind to hold down the fort, what's the survival plan for these men? I can only assume that they had volunteered to stay because they were from the local area, but if not, it looks like these men were being left to die or to be captured by Caesar.
Well, Caesar gets reports of Afranius and Petreius crossing this course and, in response, sends additional cavalry across the ford that same night. Then, in the early hours of the morning, Afranius and Petreius break camp and start marching their army south toward the Ebro. And just like that, the race has begun, and Afranius and Petreius have a huge head start. Yes, Caesar is camped very close to Ilerda, but he doesn't have access to that bridge. His infantry have to go 20 miles or 33 kilometers upriver to cross at their bridge, at which point they have to march 20 miles or 33 kilometers back downriver just to reach Ilerda on the far bank of where they started. A 40-mile or 64-kilometer detour is just not something they can overcome.
But Caesar does have one advantage to help even the playing field. As we've said, his ford has allowed him to get his cavalry across this course. And when Afranius and Petreius break camp before dawn and begin to march, suddenly Caesar's cavalry appears at the rear of their column, as Caesar writes, “milling around in great numbers”. This cavalry begins to harass the rear of the Pompeian column, slowing their advance.
As the sun rises and light begins to illuminate the scene, Caesar and his army are able to look down on the action from some high ground across the river. The Gallic cavalry are pressing hard on the rear of the Pompeian column. This slows the pace of the rearguard to the point where they are, at times, cut off from the main army altogether. The rear cohorts then form up and charge Caesar's cavalry and drive them back. Soon the Gallic cavalry rallies, though, and renews the attack on the rear of the column, and thus the process repeats itself.
When Caesar's army witnesses, with their own eyes, the Pompeians escaping, they are furious, frustrated, and exasperated. Giving us a real feel for the scene, Caesar writes in the commentaries,
"...all over the camp our troops began getting into little groups and lamenting that the enemy were being allowed to slip through our fingers and that the war was being protracted unnecessarily. They approached the centurions and military tribunes and begged them to be their spokesmen and tell Caesar not to hesitate to expose them to toil or danger. They said they were ready, able, and bold enough to cross the river in the same place the cavalry had crossed. Caesar yielded to this clamorous display of their zeal, and although he was anxious about exposing the army to so powerful a river, he felt that he must make the experiment an attempt at crossing."
The first thing Caesar does in preparation for this crossing is to pick all of the weaker soldiers out of each century. He defines these weaker soldiers as those whose courage or physique did not seem adequate to the enterprise. And you can just imagine how much shame these soldiers must have felt in the context of the honor culture of the Roman army and of antiquity as a whole. It's also a reminder that Caesar's army is not a monolith, that there are stronger and weaker soldiers. Soldiers who show great courage and soldiers whose courage everyone knows is a little bit questionable.
Caesar leaves these weaker soldiers along with one legion to guard the camp. He does not specify which legion that was. The next thing he does is to position large numbers of pack animals and cavalry above and below the partially completed ford. Presumably, the pack animals and cavalry placed upriver are there to slow down the current of the river before the ford. It's unclear how effective that would be. I do have my doubts. But the cavalry and pack animals placed downstream have a much more important job. They are there to catch any legionaries who get swept away by the current, or else to give those men something to grab onto.
With all this set, Caesar takes five of his legions out of camp in light marching order. These legions then begin crossing the Sicoris. The water comes up to their chest, and the current is powerful. It's a difficult crossing. Despite these challenges, only a few of the legionaries are swept away by the current, and all of these are caught and saved by the cavalry. So, in the end, all five legions make the crossing with no casualties.
Now, on the eastern bank of the Sicoris, Caesar forms his five legions into a triple line. He then leads them onward at that furious pace he made so famous. Moving at this blistering pace, and with the Gallic cavalry slowing the pace of the Pompeians, Caesar and his army manage to catch the Pompeians by three in the afternoon. Caesar tells us that this was despite the fact that the ford had added six miles to their journey and had taken up a lot of time. He also points out that the Pompeians had left before dawn.
When Afranius and Petreius spot Caesar's army gaining on them in the distance, Caesar tells us Afranius was appalled. So, Afranius and Petreius stop the march of their own army and position it on some high ground equipped for battle. Seeing this, Caesar halts his army on the plain they are marching on. His aim is to give them time to catch their breath rather than rushing his army directly into a battle.
After some time of both armies facing each other but neither making a move, Afranius and Petreius renew their march. Caesar again pursues them and, again, they are forced to stop. At this point, Afranius and Petreius decide to make camp for the night. Caesar follows suit and makes camp on a nearby hill.
Now, when the Pompeians make camp, they are only five miles away from what Caesar refers to as mountains. Historian Adrian Goldsworthy calls them hills. I have looked on Google Maps and as best I can tell, that area seems to have large hills rather than mountains. Regardless, Afranius and Petreius are anxious to get to these hills. Caesar writes that the tracks through the mountains or hills were narrow and difficult, so getting their army into these hills will allow them to escape Caesar's cavalry and, even more important, they will be able to block the mountain or hill passes with only a small number of troops. This would then allow the rest of the army to escape to the Ebro where they will have a pontoon bridge ready and waiting. Once across the Ebro, they will really be out of Caesar's reach, with blocked hill passes and a major river standing between them and Caesar. And I'd have to imagine that they'd start dismantling that pontoon bridge the second their last soldier crosses.
Well, night comes on with both armies still in their camps, and much of the night passes uneventfully. But then, in the middle of the night, a group of Pompeians ventures too far from their camp in an attempt to get water. This group is captured by Caesar's cavalry, which apparently continue to patrol the area even at night. These Pompeian men are then questioned, and Caesar says they told him that Afranius and Petreius were, at that very moment, leading their men out of camp in silence. Caesar immediately orders the trumpet to be sounded and gives out the order to strike camp.
Afranius and Petreius then hear this commotion from Caesar's camp and realize they've been discovered. They now begin to fear that they will be forced into a battle by Caesar in the dark while carrying their packs, or that Caesar's cavalry might pen them into some narrow pass. To be clear, they want to reach the hills or mountains, but they want to make sure that they enter the right pass and don't end up marching into some dead end in the dark. So, with these fears in mind, they order their troops back into camp.
The next morning, both armies send out a group of cavalry to scout the area between them and the hills. The Pompeian group is led by Petreius, the old warhorse. The Caesarean group is led by a man named Lucius Decidius Saxa. Both of these cavalry squadrons return to their respective armies with the same report. For the next five miles, the ground is relatively level. After that, Caesar says the terrain became mountainous and rocky. And the key point that both sides report back is that whoever seizes this hill or mountain pass first will be able to hold off the enemy with no problem at all.
So, we already had a race on our hands, but now it becomes that much clearer to both sides that the finish line is only five miles away and that whoever reaches there first wins. And Caesar here finds himself in a really bad spot, both in this Spanish campaign and in the civil war as a whole. Remember, he has to not just win this campaign, he has to do so quickly. For Afranius and Petreius, even escaping to drag out the war is a major victory. Every day they can keep this Spanish war going is another day Pompey has to gather, organize, and train his army in Greece. And believe you me, that is exactly what Pompey is doing. He is nothing if not an efficient administrator.
So, if Caesar gets bogged down in this war for too long, even if he wins, he may then turn East, only to find a Pompey that is well organized and ready for the fight. Or if the war really becomes protracted, Pompey may sail back to Italy and take Rome just as Sulla had done before him. So, Caesar's requirements for victory are much narrower than those of Afranius and Petreius. Caesar has to win and win quickly, while they just have to delay and stay alive.
And so, with all of that in mind, Caesar finds himself in a bad spot in this race to the hills too. Both armies are traveling on one path to the hills. Afranius and Petreius’ army is in front. So, how is Caesar supposed to reach the passes before they do? He can't exactly pass them on the road, and their camp is blocking his way. But as Caesar is mulling this problem over, the Pompeian camp is struggling to figure out their own plan. They know what they need to do, the hills are only 5 miles away. The question is, what is the best time to make their break for the hills? Night or day? So, Afranius and Petreius hold a council of war. At this council, the majority think that making a break for it at night is the best course. They believe this will allow them to reach the passes unnoticed. Other men say, look guys, we just tried that last night and it didn't work. They point out that Caesar's cavalry is all around them at night. They occupy every position and block every route. They also make the case that a night battle is not a fight they want.
As Caesar puts it, in the panicky atmosphere of civil war, their soldiers were more likely to be swayed by their fears than by their sense of duty. That's an interesting insight there, that civil war creates a more panicky atmosphere than a war against a foreign enemy. So, these men argue that they should make their move for the passes in the daytime. They argue that daylight will impose a sense of shame on the soldiers. It will then be under the gaze of the entire army, and this will maintain their loyalty. In the end, the men arguing for a daytime march win out, and the decision is made to start their journey the next morning at dawn.
Flashback to Caesar, and he tells us he had reconnoitered the whole area. This reconnaissance gives him an idea. This idea is a sort of gamble. The kind of gamble that looks like brilliance if you pull it off, or just a complete self-induced blunder if you don't. But as we know, not only does Caesar take these sorts of risks on a regular basis, he tends to pull them off more often than not. And in this case, it doesn't seem like he had too many other options.
So, the second there was light in the sky that morning, Caesar leads his army off-trail. He says they didn't have any marked path to follow. The ground is rough and filled with gullies and precipitous rocks. Caesar tells us this meant that, at many parts, his men had to cross these gullies or climb these rocks without their weapons. They then worked together to pass their weapons down the line. This is a rough and difficult detour, and it requires a lot of exertion from the troops. Despite this, Caesar, always the proud general, tells us his soldiers never complained about the effort. They were all too motivated by the idea that they could end the war here and now.
So, Caesar is trying to pass the Pompeians by going off-road and marching his army faster over gullies and precipitous rocks with no path than the Pompeians can march on the road. This is why I call this move a reckless gamble. And it isn't just the likelihood of success that makes it a reckless gamble. It's the stakes of that gamble, too. If Caesar's army gets caught in some defile or some dead end in this rocky terrain, then they lose this race. Lose the race, and it might mean losing the entire Civil War. It may buy Pompey enough time to invade Italy and retake Rome.
But let it never be said that Julius Caesar failed at something because he was too afraid to take action. I think he's the kind of person that could live with himself if he acted and failed. But failure through lack of action, that would be unforgivable. And not everyone is like that. I'd say most people aren't like that. I recently read Barbara Tuchman's book, The Guns of August, about the opening month of World War I, and I was amazed at how many generals froze or just completely lost their nerve when confronted with the full weight of the moment, with all the seismic ramifications any decision they made would have. I think we would all like to believe that we could make the hard decisions and take action if put in a position like that. But seeing a bunch of career generals lose their nerve, well, it does make you wonder.
Now, getting back to Afranius and Petreius, they and their soldiers can see Caesar in his men heading off-trail from the vantage point of their camp. But at first, the Pompeians don't understand what it is they're witnessing. You see, Caesar's off-road venture starts out marching in a direction other than their actual destination. Caesar doesn't tell us that this is because their route required this detour, or this is a ploy to throw the Pompeians off their true aim.
Either way, the Pompeians see Caesar and his army turning away from the mountains and marching, and they believe they've given up. So the Pompeian soldiers run out of camp and start taunting Caesar's soldiers, saying that they had been forced through lack of food to turn back to Ilerda. And it isn't just the ordinary soldiers who get called up in a moment like this. According to Caesar, Afranius and Petreius and their officers start congratulating each other on the decision to stay in camp that night rather than attempting to make it to the passes by night.
So there's a lot of back-slapping and high-fiving and gloating going on, but then they start to notice that Caesar's column is gradually snaking around to the right. In fact, the head of his column is now already working its way past their camp. And suddenly, everyone realizes what's really happening here. Caesar is trying to bypass them on the road and make it to the mountain pass first. With that sudden realization, all of the Pompeians are in agreement that they must march out of camp now. The call to arms is given.
Caesar tells us there was no hanging back or shirking. Leaving a few cohorts to guard their camp and baggage, the rest of the army marches out on the most direct path to the Ebro and the mountain passes. Caesar writes on this in the commentaries,
"It was a race to reach the mountain passes and everything depended on speed. And while Caesar's army was delayed by the difficulties of its route, his cavalry was following closely behind Afranius' forces and delaying them."
So the race is on, but the Pompeians, in their rush not to be beaten by Caesar, haven't quite realized yet the position Caesar has put them in. The second they realized he was trying to pass them and seize the passes, they immediately rushed out of camp to beat him. But what if they do beat him? How will they recover the cohorts left at the camp or their baggage also left at the camp? Caesar and his army will then stand between them and their old camp. So the Pompeians are put in a sort of lose- lose situation. If Caesar makes it to the passes first, their escape will be cut off. If they make it to the passes first, Caesar will cut them off from their baggage along with the cohorts guarding it. In the end, the worst of both worlds happens for the Pompeians. Caesar, despite the difficulty of his route, makes it to the mountain passes first. With this seized, Caesar draws up his men on some level ground among the crags to confront the Pompeians. Now with Caesar's infantry in front of them blocking their way and with his cavalry attacking them from behind, the Pompeians are trapped.
Afranius halts his men on a hill for protection. Caesar's explanation for what happens next seems a little bit confusing, but he tells us Afranius sent out four cohorts of light Spanish infantry to the highest mountain or hill in sight with orders to storm and seize it. Caesar says the intention was to then move the rest of the army to this mountain or hill and from there to turn off to Octogesa over the mountain ridges. Basically it sounds like the intention was to seize the highest hill around and from there go by a different route to reach their bridge. So the Spanish targeteers make their way for this hill via a side route, probably to avoid being noticed by Caesar's forces.
To no avail though. Caesar's cavalry spots these cohorts and attacks. The cohorts hold their ground for a long time, but eventually they are surrounded and killed by Caesar's cavalry. This all happens as both armies look on. And with this success, Caesar recognizes he has an opportunity to win the entire campaign right here and now. He writes that he was fully aware that the Pompeians would be shaken after watching their four cohorts get cut down like that and therefore would not be able to hold out against his army.
What's more, the battle would take place on relatively open and flat ground. This means that his cavalry would outflank and surround them. And Caesar isn't the only person who realizes this. In fact, his whole army seems to realize this and they are eager to end this campaign. Caesar paints quite a vivid picture of this in the commentaries. He writes that all sections of his army urgently demanded an engagement. His lieutenants, centurions, and military tribunes crowd around him, urging him to attack at once, saying that the troops are all keyed up in readiness. They start listing off reasons to Caesar for attacking. They say the Pompeians are afraid. Just look how they wouldn't leave their hill even to help the four cohorts who were butchered by the Gallic cavalry right in front of them. And what did they do? They just stood there and watched.
They point out to Caesar that even at that moment, the Pompeians are barely holding their ground on the hill against his cavalry attacks. They are huddled together on the hill with their standards all massed together, making no attempt to keep their ranks or to stand by their own standards. Caesar quotes his men as saying to him,
“Perhaps you are uneasy because their present position puts you at a disadvantage, meaning that they're currently on a hill. But you will have a chance of battle in some place or other. Afranius is bound to come down. He cannot stay up there without water."
This is where leading an army like this requires supreme self-confidence and self-assuredness. Caesar has all these men crowding around him, all in agreement as to what needs to be done and all pressing him to do it. It would take a lot of confidence and nerve to resist all that pressure, even as the general. Nerve and confidence are two qualities Caesar has never lacked. He tells us his hope was that since he had cut off the Pompeians food supply, he might be able to end this campaign without involving his men in fighting or bloodshed. He quotes himself as replying to all these men pressing in on him,
“Why should I sacrifice some of my men, even for a victory? Why should I allow the troops who have done me such excellent service to be wounded? Why in fine should I tempt providence? - especially as I know that a good commander should be able to gain as much by policy as by the sword. Besides, I am stirred by pity for the citizens whom I see must be killed; I would rather gain my ends without any harm befalling them.”
These sentiments expressed by Caesar are quite lofty, particularly for an army in antiquity. He tells us this view of his did not meet with general approbation. In fact, he gives us a glimpse into a sort of family dispute between him and his army. Angered at his refusal to attack the Pompeians, Caesar's soldiers start openly avowing to each other that since Caesar is throwing away such a great chance for victory, they will not fight even when he wants them to.
These are some wild words given the typical brutal discipline of a Roman army. But Caesar has always been more lenient with his soldiers than most Roman generals. And like I said, this is more like a family dispute than a revolt. These soldiers are heated and angry in this moment that Caesar is preventing them from attacking. But they aren't really going to mutiny on him and refuse to fight at a later time.
But it is a sign that Caesar's army is becoming increasingly fed up with his policy of clemency and his shows of mercy. We saw this even as far back as the final year of the Gallic Wars, when they pressured Caesar into having Gutruater, a leader of the Carnutes, beaten to death then decapitated. Clemency and mercy are not qualities that come natural to an ancient soldier. I don't think they really understood this policy. And certainly it is often them who have to pay the price for it. When political enemies are pardoned just to return right back to the fight, Caesar may be happy to defeat them a second time, but it is his soldiers who had to risk their lives doing so.
So put yourself in their shoes. Imagine you defeat the forces of some enemy commander, he surrenders, and Caesar pardons him. Then this enemy turns right back around and joins the war against you again, like Ahenobarbus has already done. Maybe this time your best friend and brother in arms dies in the fighting. How is that going to make you feel about this policy of clemency? How does it benefit you and your fellow soldiers?
And this is one reason why clemency is rare in the warfare of antiquity. Well, first, most generals are just not interested. They just don't have the temperament for that. But even if they were interested in showing clemency, such a policy might well cause a revolt among their troops. It's not an uncommon phenomenon in Roman history for soldiers to mutiny and kill their general. In fact, you might remember, Caesar's father-in-law, Cinna, was killed in just such a mutiny.
But because of their close bond and his own charisma, Caesar can get his army to go along with his policy of clemency, however grudgingly. Despite their claims that they won't fight at a future date, Caesar says he's stuck to his decision and refused to be swayed by everyone around him. In fact, he orders his soldiers blocking the Pompeian route back to their camp to withdraw a little, to lessen the Pompeian fears. This opens the way for the Pompeians to return to their camp. We can only imagine how indignant Caesar's soldiers were at this. It's one thing to refuse to attack the enemy, it's quite another to intentionally allow them out of a trap so that they can then return to their fortified camp and baggage train. Caesar does not tell us what their reaction was to this.
Allowing the Pompeians to escape like this is also a sign of Caesar's supreme confidence in victory. A general who is in doubt of his ability to defeat the enemy would need to be ruthless and crush them if given the opportunity. But Caesar has such belief in his ability to win this campaign, he doesn't mind letting them out of his trap. He has complete faith that he can defeat them again if needed. And really, he's looking for a more advanced form of victory. He wants a victory that, yes, is fast, but also one that preserves his own soldiers' lives and those of the enemy and thus creates a propaganda victory.
So with Afranius and Petreius and their army now back in camp, Caesar sets guards to block the pass and build the camp for his own army as close to the Pompeians as possible. With Afranius and Petreius thoroughly boxed in, it's now just a matter of maneuvering them into a checkmate and forcing them to surrender.
And that is where we will end our narrative today. In our next episode, Caesar will borrow a page from Sulla's clever playbook and allow his soldiers to mingle with the enemy army.
But of course, we have our reviews and ending quote to cover before our episode ends today. Our first review is from Ryan on Podcast Republic. Ryan writes, “you can tell the host has a real passion for history and the story they are laying out for us. This has reignited my passion for history.”.
Ryan, I am ecstatic to hear I was able to reignite your passion for history. I think that should always be the goal in teaching, not just history, but in any subject. You should want people learning to walk away with a newfound passion for a subject, or at the very least an interest or fascination. Because when you are passionate about, or even just interested in a subject, you naturally seek to learn more in the future, and quite possibly throughout your entire life. So thank you, Ryan, for your wonderful review, and thank you for listening.
Our second review is from Jake, who I have connected with on social media. Jake's title reads, “My Favorite History Podcast”. He then writes, “I don't usually give reviews, but this series is too good not to leave one. Trevor may be the best storyteller I have ever listened to. Good luck on your recovery. I know you have been going through a tough time, but I have no doubt if you keep going, you will have one of the biggest history podcasts in the world.”
Wow. Thank you so much, Jake, and I certainly hope this podcast becomes one of the biggest history podcasts in the world. It certainly continues to grow, and at a faster and faster rate, which is very exciting. And that growth is heavily aided by you listeners spreading the word.
Jake also contributed financially to the March for History via Venmo. So he is a true fan of the show and is doing everything he can to help it succeed. I also thank you for the well wishes on my health. Things continue to improve, though, at a glacial pace. And most days I'm still pushing through a lot of pain, brain fog, and lethargy. But there are positive developments. For example, I've finally managed to gain back a good amount of the weight I had lost, which is a great sign. So that's my little health update for you guys. Most episodes I don't mention it because, like I said, things are moving along at a glacial pace and there really isn't a lot of news. But thus far, the good news is that I'm gaining weight again.
Finally, Jake, I'll say I'm glad you enjoy my storytelling so much and that the March of History is your favorite history podcast, I love to hear that.
And of course, thank you to all of our regular patrons, Mark, Liga, Laurie, Scott, Peggy, Carey, Desert Legionnaire, and Vish. Thank you all.
And now for our ending quote. Our ending quote for today involves a very short story. In the year 37 AD, the future Emperor Nero was born. And fun fact, Nero is the great, great grandson of Caesar's enemy and Cato's brother-in-law, Ahenobarbus.
Well, Suetonius makes the point of telling us that Nero came from a long line of despicable, arrogant, and rude men on his father's side. And then, of course, his mother, Agrippina, was Caligula's sister and had a tough reputation in her own right. So when Nero was just born and his father, Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, was out and about, someone congratulated him on the birth of his son, that is, young Nero, to which Nero's father replied, that any child born to himself and Agrippina was bound to have a detestable nature and become a public danger. Oh, how right he was. You almost have to admire that level of self-awareness.
And that is all for today. Keep on sharing the podcast with everyone you know. Don't forget about your free Audible trial. The link is in the show notes of this episode. And I'll talk to you on the next episode of the March of History.