75. Caesar's Clemency

With their hopes of escape in the mountains dashed, and finding themselves hemmed in on all sides by Caesar, Afranius and Petreius and their officers meet to discuss their options. Their army is alive and intact only due to the grace of Caesar. Had he chosen to, he could have annihilated them, and his army was eager to do so. But Caesar had allowed them to return to their camp and baggage. And so the topic of this meeting of Pompeian commanders and the decision facing them is, what now? How do we proceed?

Despite Caesar's shows of mercy, they are no more inclined to surrender than before. But given the terrified state of their army and the position they find themselves in, fighting is not an option either. So in this meeting of officers, they come to the conclusion that there are only two options on the table for them. The first of these options is to attempt to make their way back to Ilerda, the city that they had originally fled from. Hardly ideal given that they had left Ilerda for a reason.

The second option is to try to march for the city of Tarraco. This doesn't sound like an appealing option either given that Caesar has already told us that the people of Tarraco had defected to him. But the Pompeians are desperate, and governing by committee is inefficient, and in this civil war, Caesar will often have the advantage of being the sole decision maker in his army. Caesar is a man who thinks and acts far quicker than most individuals.

But when you contrast that with the speed and decisiveness of a committee, well, it's night and day. And of course, indecision is a decision. And so while the Pompeians are busy debating what to do next, Caesar removes any decision from them at all, and acts first, forcing them to react to him. And so, during this meeting, the Pompeians are interrupted when word comes to them that Caesar's cavalry have begun harassing their men set out to fetch water. If they get cut off from water, the Pompeians will be forced to surrender in a matter of days.

Therefore, everything else must be dropped and this crisis resolved. So as I said, they are now reacting to Caesar rather than acting proactively. So Afranius and Petreius send out detachments of cavalry and auxiliary cohorts to act as guards of the water route. They place legionary cohorts between these detachments, and set these cohorts to building a rampart stretching from their camp to the source of water. The idea is to have a fortified path for their people to follow when going to retrieve water. In this way, they will essentially never have to leave their camp when fetching water, and little to no guards will be needed to guard this water route.

If this sounds like a fairly sizable construction project, that's because it is, and Caesar tells us that Afranius and Petreius shared the work between their forces. It is an interesting glimpse we are given there that certain legions are still seen as belonging to Petreius rather than all of them now belonging to Afranius because he is the consular, the more senior man. But far more importantly, this construction project requires the personal supervision of both commanders. And so Petreius and Afranius both leave camp, traveling what Caesar describes as a considerable distance from their camp. Certainly it's far enough away that they can no longer see their camp, and just as importantly their soldiers in camp can no longer see them.

Now if you've ever been part of a sports team in your younger days, or perhaps you're still in school and are on such a team, and you know that when the coach leaves the scene, discipline often goes off the rails, and the players start doing all sorts of things they would normally get in trouble for doing with the coach around. Well this particular Roman army is no different.

When Afranius and Petreius leave, Caesar tells us there was a general exodus from the Pompeian camp of soldiers and officers alike, looking to fraternize with Caesar's men. Now Caesar has a few choices here. He can ignore these men, he can use this as an opportunity to attack these men, or he can allow his men to mingle with the enemy.

Seeing as Caesar has no doubts as to the loyalty and commitment of his soldiers, and seeing as he wants to bring this war to a peaceful conclusion, he opts for the third option, and lets his soldiers fraternize with the enemy. Now this is not an uncommon tactic in Roman civil wars. Sulla did this several times. A general with a more famous reputation will happily let their troops mingle with the enemy because they know it often facilitates said enemy defecting to their side. After all, if you are a soldier of Afranius and Petreius, how are you feeling about the odds of victory right about now?Not so hot.

And on the other side, isn't some barbarian attempting to sack and pillage your homeland, but a Roman general in charge of a Roman army, your own people. You speak the same language, you have the same customs and religion. Heck, you might even know some of the soldiers in the opposing army. So when some of these soldiers start telling you about how great it is to fight for Caesar, how the man never loses, how he shares all his spoils with the men, how he isn't a disciplinarian, and all of his men love him, well, you start to think to yourself, why the heck am I risking my life to fight for Afranius and Petreius in a losing war when I could be fighting for the great Julius Caesar? And now what's that? His men tell me he'd be happy to have me? Sign me up. No death, dishonor, and defeat for me. I'm joining the winning side.

And so, with exactly this sort of thing in mind, Caesar allows his troops to mingle with the Pompeians. In a very Roman fashion, the Pompeian soldiers start asking after friends and men from their hometowns that they have heard are serving with Caesar. As always, Roman culture has a heavy emphasis on personal relationships. The Pompeians then express their gratitude for the events of yesterday, that is, when Caesar had spared them and allowed them to return to their camp. They thank Caesar's men for sparing them when they were utterly terror-stricken. Caesar quotes them as saying, we owe our lives to you. We aren't told whether Caesar's men admitted that they had wanted to crush and kill the Pompeians, and it had been Caesar that had restrained them. I imagine they kept that part to themselves.

Well, soon conversation begins to flow between the two sides, likely many conversations. Caesar tells us the Pompeians asked whether Caesar could be trusted and whether they would be right to put themselves in his hands. They expressed regret at not having done so in the first place and having done battle with their own friends and kinsmen.

Caesar does not tell us his soldiers' response, but we'd have to imagine they have reassured the Pompeians on those fronts because Caesar does tell us that this conversation emboldened the Pompeians to ask for assurances from Caesar that the lives of Afranius and Petreius would be spared. Caesar even tells us they were so transparent as to openly say they wanted to guarantee the safety of Afranius and Petreius because they did not want to incur the guilt of a crime and bear the stigma of having betrayed their own people. So it seems to be less about heartfelt feelings of loyalty to Afranius and Petreius and more about not wanting to appear like rebellious traitors without honor. In other words, what they are really worried about is their own reputation.

Anyway, assurances that Afranius and Petreius would be spared are given and the Pompeians promise to bring their standards over to Caesar at once. Of course, with the standards come all the soldiers attached to those standards. The Pompeians then send a deputation of leading centurions to discuss a settlement with Caesar. As this meeting between Caesar and the Pompeian deputation is happening, the atmosphere between the two sides becomes increasingly friendly and convivial. By this point, some of the Pompeian soldiers have located their friends among the Caesareans. They invite these friends back to visit their own camp and there's a sort of mutual exchange of hospitality. Caesar tells us the two camps seem to have become one.

Things continue to move in this direction when a number of Pompeian tribunes and centurions approach Caesar and offer him their services. Next, some of the Spanish chieftains who Caesar says were being held hostage by the Pompeians make their way over to Caesar's camp. There they seek out acquaintances and traditional family friends through whom they might each gain access to Caesar and demonstrate their goodwill. Finally, Caesar tells us that even Afranius' young son tried to negotiate with Caesar for his own and his father's life through Caesar's lieutenant, Sulpicius.
Caesar writes in the Civil War commentaries describing this scene,

"The whole scene was one of joy and self-congratulation, one side thankful at their escape from such great peril, the other rejoicing at having, as it seemed, brought so great a conflict to a conclusion without bloodshed. Everyone recognized that Caesar was reaping the benefits of his original clemency and his decision met with universal approval.".
So the same show of clemency that Caesar's men were up in arms about only yesterday, declaring that they would refuse to fight for Caesar since he wouldn't let them attack then and there, Caesar's men are now admitting was actually the right move and they universally approve. So like I said in the last episode, the whole dispute between Caesar and his men was more of a family squabble in the heat of the moment rather than anything more serious.

So we have this whole scene of joy and self-congratulation and gratitude where both camps seem to have become one and the Spanish War appears to be over. But then Afranius and Petreius return to camp.
Now I took the time to explain the difference between Afranius and Petreius and their personalities back in episode 71 when I first laid out the groundwork for this campaign. But thus far their personalities really haven't played a huge part in the story. This is where that changes. This is where their individual personalities will play a huge role in how they react to this crisis. And they couldn't react in more polar opposite ways.

Afranius seems to have gotten word of what was happening back at camp first. Someone snitched I guess. Well, Afranius the dancer leaves the construction works and heads back to the camp. When he arrives, Caesar says he appeared ready to accept whatever had happened with calm and without perturbation. In other words, Afranius takes a sort of laissez-faire approach. He isn't mad at his officers or his men. He isn't mad at his young son. He knows they were in a bad spot and he isn't going to fight the inevitable. They didn't really have a chance of winning.

But when Petreius, the 43 year military veteran, gets word of what's happening, the old warhorse reacts in a radically different way. Petreius arms some of the slaves on his personal staff. To these he adds a cohort of Spanish light infantry who acted as his personal bodyguard and some Spanish cavalry. Taking these men, he unexpectedly swoops down on his own camp. There he interrupts the joyous atmosphere and starts killing any Caesarean soldier he can get his hands on.

When one of Petreius' own officers tries to restrain him, Appian tells us Petreius kills this officer with his own hands. Some of Caesar's men are driven out of the camp. The rest rally together and, gripping their shields with their left hands, they draw their swords in their right hands and defend themselves from the Spanish light infantry and cavalry. Fortunately, their camp is not far away and they manage to make it there, where they're able to take protection under the cohorts on guard duty.

So Petreius has thoroughly killed the good vibe, butchering some of Caesar's men who had been invited there under a flag of truce, and even killing his own officer for trying to stop the massacre. But he isn't done killing the mood yet. Caesar tells us Petreius then makes a tour of his companies, weeping and begging them not to betray himself and not to betray Pompey. Soon Petreius' men gather on the parade ground. There, according to Caesar, Petreius exacts an oath from his soldiers. An oath that they will not abandon the army and its leader, and that they will not act individually in their own interests. Petreius leads the way by publicly taking the oath first. According to Caesar, he then compels Afranius to take the same oath. After Afranius, the tribunes and centurions take the oath, and finally the ordinary soldiers are brought up by sentry to take the oath.

Petreius then decides to seal their new oath in blood. When he had first come storming into the camp, killing Caesar's soldiers, many of the Pompeian soldiers had hidden Caesarean soldiers in their tents. After all, they were friends with these men and had invited them under a flag of truce back to their camp. They felt honor-bound to protect them, even from their own general. And Petreius knows this.

So Petreius orders any soldier who has one of Caesar's men hidden in his quarters to bring him out onto the parade ground. All the Caesarean soldiers that are then dragged out of hiding onto the parade ground are publicly put to death at Petreius' order. This is a really dastardly move by Petreius. These are his countrymen, lured to his camp by the offer of a truce, and Petreius is executing them in cold blood. This is the first time we have seen the Pompeians behave in this brutal fashion. It will not be the last.

Throughout this civil war, the Pompeian leadership will routinely act with such brutality exactly because they believe they have the moral right on their side. Because they believe they are fighting for the Republic and all that is good in the Roman world, they therefore believe that Caesar and all who follow him are essentially monsters and therefore it is acceptable to treat them as such. While Caesar declares that anyone who is not actively against him he considers for him, the Pompeians consider anyone who is not actively for them as being against them. That is to say, while Caesar considers a neutral individual to be an ally, the Pompeians consider a neutral individual to be an enemy. And as we all know from Star Wars, only a Sith deals in absolutes!

And in fact, some Pompeians will even advocate for the idea of executing neutrals. Again, this is all driven by their unshakable belief in the rightness of their cause. If everything that is right and good and moral in this world is on their side, then just being neutral is not good enough. A good citizen needs to do more than stand by and watch as his city is attacked. He is expected to take up arms in her defense. Anything short of that is inexcusable and should thus be treated as the actions of an enemy.

And those who actively take up arms against the Optimates, well, they are rebellious traitors and should be shown no quarter and no mercy. And so, even as Caesar shows clemency and mercy to his enemies, as he had only the day before to Petreius and his army, Petreius drags his Caesarean soldiers out from hiding and, disregarding a truce, executes them in cold blood.

Now, I specifically say the Pompeian leadership behaved this way because it is not necessarily true of the ordinary Pompeian soldiers. And though Petreius calls for all the Caesareans to be pulled out of hiding and put to death, only a few actually are. That is because only a few of the Pompeian soldiers produce their hidden Caesareans. The rest keep their mouths shut and, when night comes, help the Caesarean soldiers escape over the ramparts.
Summing up this oath sealed with the massacre of his men, Caesar writes,

“In this way, by intimidating their men, by exacting ruthless punishment, and by imposing the bond of a fresh oath, Afranius and Petreius quashed hopes of a surrender for the time being. They swayed the feelings of their soldiers and restored the war to its old footing.”.

When word of this massacre and the end of the truce reaches Caesar, he has a decision to make. There are still lots of Pompeian soldiers and officers in Caesar's camp. He can easily respond in kind and have them seized and executed. But of course, that isn't Caesar's style. Instead, Caesar orders that the Pompeian soldiers in his camp should be sought out with the utmost care and sent back. So even as Petreius executes Caesar's men under a banner of truce, Caesar sends back Petreius's men with the utmost care.

And this sort of contrasting behavior is not lost on the soldiers. In fact, Caesar tells us an appreciable number of Pompeian tribunes and centurions decided to stay behind and defect to Caesar's army. Now, I'm sure the fact that Caesar looks likely to win this campaign has a big influence on that decision, but so does the word that Petreius murdered one of his officers and is executing Caesar's men. Not exactly a welcoming environment to return home to. It's not as if Petreius won't know exactly where they've been.

And to make the contrast between the two leadership styles that much more stark, Caesar tells us he showed these officials signal honor, restoring the centurions to their former ranks and making the equites tribunes in his army. For a lot of soldiers, that seems like an easy choice. Join the winning side and keep your existing rank or go back to the losing side and face the wrath of Petreius.

And so having come so close to victory, Caesar could almost taste it, the war is now renewed. But of course, the Pompeians are still facing all the critical problems they were facing before the attempted truce. In fact, conditions are getting worse. Already Afranius and Petreius were struggling to secure their water supply. Well, now they add food to their list of shortages.

Upon leaving Ilerda, they had ordered their men to pack 22 days' worth of food for the journey. The Roman legionaries dutifully did so, but the Spanish auxiliaries and the targeteers did not. Caesar tells us they didn't pack any food. He says they were physically not accustomed to carrying loads. Another translation I have seems to indicate that they just weren't in the right kind of shape to haul heavy packs of food with them. And so facing the prospect of either starving or defecting to Caesar, the decision looks like an easy one. Large numbers of the Spanish auxiliaries begin defecting to Caesar each day.

It is at this point that the Pompeian officers finally come to their decision on what route to take. They decide to make the trip back to Ilerda, largely because it's a shorter route than the one to Sirocco, and because they have left some food in Ilerda. The Pompeians duly begin marching back the way they had come, with Caesar following.

It's unclear if Caesar intentionally allowed them to march away. He seems to indicate earlier that he had them surrounded, and then suddenly they are marching back the way they had come, so maybe he let them go, I don't know. Either way, the two sides quickly fall back into the familiar old pattern. Caesar's Gallic cavalry stay hot in the Pompeian heels, frequently harassing their rearguard. Behind them follows Caesar's main army.

Caesar gives us a pretty detailed description of the tactics being employed by the Pompeians. He says the Pompeian rearguard, where the action was taking place, was made up of cohorts in light marching order. When the Pompeian army reaches a stretch of level ground, several of these cohorts stop and hold their ground in order to cover the retreat of the rest of the army. If the Pompeian army has to march up a sort of incline, a hill, then the rearguard has no need to make a stand like this. Caesar tells us the advantageous high ground allowed the troops who had already ascended to defend the men behind them still making the ascent. Meaning, much like when Caesar's men got trapped on the Hill of Ilerda, the Pompeian soldiers can rain down missiles on the pursuing cavalry to protect the men marching further down behind them.

So, the Pompeians have flat stretches and inclines down to a science. The real issue they face is when they come to an area where they have to descend down a hill or into a valley. When this happens, the men in the front, who are further downhill, are unable to help the men behind them. Caesar specifically says they could not bring help to the men falling behind, which implies that they were stragglers.

Caesar's Gallic cavalry, following the Pompeians, then find themselves with the high ground and are able to rain down missiles onto the exposed backs of the Pompeians. This is not a position the Pompeians want to find themselves in, where at any moment a javelin or arrow or rock can just hit you in the back.

So to avoid being put in this kind of situation, the Pompeians start employing a new tactic. Wherever the Pompeians come across terrain that requires some sort of descent, rather than descending right away, they instead gather all their men at the point just before the descent and their halt. Once ready, the legionaries charge the pursuing Gallic cavalry. Once the Gallic cavalry have been routed, they turn back and rush full speed down into the valley, then up the next incline, where they halt and, presumably, renew the process.

Now all of this may have you wondering where the Pompeian cavalry is during all this. When the campaign first started, Caesar said they had 10,000 cavalrymen. In fact, Caesar said they had a numerical advantage over his cavalry. Well, at some point, things seem to have changed and, at this point, Caesar's cavalry have a heavy advantage.
Of course, he has received reinforcements along the way. There is the 900-man Germanic cavalry bodyguard he arrived with, and there are the Gallic cavalry who arrived with the Gallic convoys. Maybe some of the Pompeian cavalry deserted or defected too, we don't really know. Or maybe Caesar exaggerated their cavalry numbers to begin with, that's also a possibility.

But Caesar tells us that, at this point, the Pompeians still had a large number of cavalry. However, he says that, due to their earlier defeats and various skirmishes against Caesar's forces, by this point in the campaign, the Pompeian Spanish cavalry have just completely lost their nerve. I mean, completely lost their nerve is an exact quote from the translation on Caesar's commentaries. And so, rather than being of any help to the Pompeians, their cavalry has to be taken into the center of the army for their own protection.

This is the usual order of things being turned upside down. The cavalry should be out there screening the enemy and protecting the infantry. Instead, they are having to hide in the center of the infantry for their own protection. Caesar tells us that none of the Pompeian cavalry could leave the line of march without getting picked off by his Gallic cavalry.
Well, this whole pattern of the Pompeian stopping and starting continues, and so their progress towards Ilerda is very slow. In fact, so slow that, at this point, they've only made it four miles. And when they come under heavy pressure from Caesar's cavalry, they stop on top of a hill and make their camp. Apparently, the Pompeians are frustrated with their slow progress and are calling it quits for the day.

Caesar follows suit and pitches his own camp nearby. Tents are set up, and the Gallic cavalry are sent out in search of food. But Afranius and Petreius are playing a clever little trick. They haven't unloaded any of their pack animals. And so, at noon, when they see Caesar's cavalry have been sent away, they suddenly break camp and start marching again. The Pompeians had never intended to make camp at all. They just wanted to get rid of Caesar's cavalry, which was slowing them down.

Caesar quickly realizes that this was the whole point of the ruse, though, and he doesn't want to let them escape. So he leads his infantry out of camp in pursuit and leaves a few cohorts behind to guard his baggage. He orders these cohorts to follow with the baggage at four o'clock and orders the cavalry and foragers recalled.

The Gallic cavalry soon catches up, and the process of stop-start marching is renewed. Caesar describes his cavalry as fighting so energetically they almost rout the Pompeians. In fact, they managed to kill a number of Pompeian soldiers, including several centurions. Meanwhile, he tells us his main force was close on their heels, menacing the Pompeians in mass.

Eventually this pressure on the Pompeian army becomes so great that they are forced to stop and pitch camp on unfavorable ground far from a water supply. But this time, Caesar is wise to their tricks, and he forbids his soldiers from setting up any tents. He writes that he wanted to be ready day or night in case the Pompeians made a break for Ilerda. And despite the weak position of the Pompeian camp and their poor morale, Caesar maintains his policy of not provoking a battle.

That night, it becomes clear to the Pompeians how poorly positioned their camp is, and so they spend all night extending their lines of fortification, but eventually they just abandon that camp altogether and build a new camp. Again, this is all happening in the middle of the night.

But Caesar tells us all this work on their part was useless. The more they extended their lines and moved their camp, the further from water they got. And so Caesar writes in the commentaries that they cured their existing troubles only by creating fresh ones.

That first night, none of the Pompeians go out to get water. I'm sure they were too busy with their construction projects, but they were also afraid. Not of the dark or of the boogeyman, but of Caesar's cavalry patrols, which really are worse than any monster in the dark. These are hard men that will chop you into pieces if they catch you.

So the next day, with the sun bright and shining, the Pompeians decide there's strength in numbers and strength in daylight, so they leave a guard at their camp and march the entire rest of the army out to get water. This plan works, and Caesar leaves them be, but they are still too intimidated to send men out in search of fodder for their animals.

Now given the poor position of their camp, Caesar decides to starve and thirst them out here, but he has to stop them from taking group trips to the local watering hole. He also knows that if they become thirsty or hungry enough, the Pompeians will try to break out for Ilerda. Caesar's solution for both these obstacles, both stopping them from getting food and water and stopping them from breaking out, is to contain them with a rampart and ditch which he sets his soldiers to constructing.

As Caesar's circumvallation project is progressing, the Pompeians make the somewhat drastic decision to kill all of their baggage animals. Caesar says they did this because they had no food to feed them, and they felt these animals were slowing them down. I'd also imagine they helped to feed the army.

Well, Caesar's fortifications continue to progress for two days as the Pompeians watch. And on the third day, with work coming along nicely, the Pompeians decide that they need to put a stop to this rampart and ditch. So at three in the afternoon, the Pompeian legions march out of camp and array themselves for battle just below their camp. This is a challenge to Caesar, and one he knows he can't ignore.

Caesar writes that his reputation would suffer a severe setback if he gave the appearance of shunning a battle, contrary to the general feeling among his troops, and that this would cause a setback to his reputation in the world at large. That drives home just how important the appearance of strength was in the ancient world. Even at this point, with the Pompeians nearing checkmate, if Caesar refuses an offer of battle, then in this campaign, in Spain, and indeed in the whole Mediterranean, his reputation will take a hit.

And so Caesar recalls his men from the earthworks and musters his cavalry and forms them up for battle. The potential battlefield is far from ideal. It's small, comprising only of the two miles between Caesar's camp and the Pompeian camp. The armies take up a third of the battlefield each, and the final third is the neutral ground between them. Put differently, Caesar says this middle third was left for charging and attacking.

All of this means the armies are very close to each other and very close to their camps. Because of this close proximity to the camps, the losing side can easily retreat to safety when defeated. Which means that even if Caesar does engage in battle and wins, which he fully expects to, the battle would not even be a decisive one. One more reason to avoid battle.

So after lining up his army and sizing up the scene like this, Caesar decides he will hold his ground at the Pompeians' attack, but will not attack himself. But Afranius and Petreius, they don't really want a battle. They just want to interrupt Caesar's earthworks. And so both sides stand arrayed for battle, staring at each other until sunset, at which point they both retreat to their camps.

The next day, Caesar sets his men to finishing their rampart and ditch to box the Pompeians in. The Pompeians, meanwhile, send out a force to see if they can ford the Sicoris River, which is apparently not so far away. In response, Caesar sends out what he calls his German Light Troops, or Light-Armed Germans, along with a portion of the cavalry to cross the river and post a guard. This is one of those interesting moments when Caesar mentions some variety of soldier that we didn't even know he had. I don't think he's ever made mention of Light German Infantry before, but here they are.

Anyway, with this attempt to get some men across the Sicoris blocked, the Pompeians are well and truly checkmated. They have nowhere to go. At this point, they are short of food, water, wood, they are on their fourth day of having no fodder for animals that they did keep against the cavalry.

So seeing no options outside of a death stand, something their soldiers probably wouldn't go in for, Afranius and Petreius finally send word to Caesar that they'd like to have a peace conference. They specifically request that this conference be in private, away from the soldiers. Caesar is having none of this. Similar to when he became consul and made sure all speeches in the Senate were recorded and made public, Caesar wants the world to know exactly what goes on at this conference. He wants witnesses so that events can't be twisted by the Pompeians in the future. And probably most importantly of all, Caesar wants an audience.

With his demagogic ability to work a crowd, with his charisma, his showmanship, his public speaking abilities, Caesar knows poor Afranius and Petreius won't stand a chance. It's similar to U.S. presidential elections when one candidate prefers a large audience at debates and another prefers no audience. Some people feed off the crowd, others are made nervous by it.

Afranius and Petreius don't want a crowd. But nor do they have a strong negotiating position, so they concede this point to Caesar. Afranius then gives over his son as a hostage to Caesar and a meeting is held in a spot of Caesar's choosing. The spot Caesar chooses is within earshot of both armies. Afranius speaks first. Caesar tells us he spoke in the most humble and abject manner possible. He tells Caesar he should have no ill will with him or Petreius or their armies for having wanted to keep the faith with their general, Pompey.

However, Afranius says he now believes they have adequately fulfilled their duty. He also says he believes that they have already been adequately punished by having to endure privation. He says that Caesar now has them penned up like beasts. Finally, he says, we cannot reach water, we cannot move on, and we can no longer endure our physical sufferings and our sense of disgrace. We admit we are beaten. We earnestly beg, if there is any room for pity left, that you will not feel obliged to exact the supreme penalty. By supreme penalty, he means the death penalty.

Now, remember, these are the leaders who massacred Caesar's veteran soldiers under a flag of truce. Petreius had killed any Caesarean soldier he could get his hands on, and when he could find no more, he ordered his men to drag any hidden Caesareans out from their tents so he could execute them on the parade ground. And Afranius let it all happen, sat there and watched it happen.

And so, hearing these words from Afranius, begging Caesar to show pity, well, you can imagine how Caesar felt about that. And so, Caesar decides to rip into Afranius and Petreius with, what is for me, the greatest speech we have recorded from Julius Caesar, my personal favorite. Not because of the weight of the moment, this Spanish campaign is small-scale compared to some of the others of the Civil War. No, it's my favorite because of the rhetorical devices Caesar employs. It's my favorite because of how it drips with emotion even when read on a page 2,000 years later. And because of how it makes his argument and condemnation of Afranius and Petreius in such a crystal clear way, it's hard to argue.

I love this speech because Caesar goes beyond the scope of this Spanish campaign. He uses this speech to vent all his accumulated frustrations with the Pompeians and with the Optimates. In essence, though Caesar shows clemency and mercy on the field of battle, in the battlefield of oratory, he takes no prisoners and he rips into his enemies with gusto.
Quoting himself in the commentaries, Caesar gives us his reply speech to Afranius after Afranius appealed to Caesar to show pity. Caesar says,

“No one in the whole army has less rights to complaints and self-pity than you. All the rest acted as they should; I did, in that I refused to fight, even when conditions, time, and place were suitable in order to avoid, as far as possible, prejudicing the chances of peace. My army did, since even when they were subjected to outrage and some of their members were killed, they preserved and protected the men they had in their power. Your army did, since of their own initiative they sought a reconciliation, thinking that thereby they ought to have regard for the lives of all their comrades. Thus, the part played by all sections was a compassionate one; you alone shrank from peace. It was you who did not observe the conventions of a truce and a conference; you who brutally put to death guileless men, who had been deceived by the offer of a chance to talk. And so you have suffered the fate that commonly befalls those who are too stubborn and arrogant; you are now forced to have recourse to the very thing you spurned only a little while ago, and indeed to beg for it. I do not now intend to take advantage of your humiliation and of the present circumstances so as to increase my own resources; I require only the disbanding of those armies which you have maintained against me these many years.

I say ‘against me’, for it is for no other reason that six legions were sent to Spain, and a seventh enrolled here, and so many large fleets prepared and experienced commanders sent in to lead them. None of these preparations was intended for the pacification of Spain or the administration of the province; it had been at peace for a long time, and had no need of them. All these preparations had been going on, for a long time, to attack me. To attack me, a new kind of military command has been created, in which the same person can stay at the gates of Rome and supervise politics in the city, and at the same time hold command for so many years, in absence, of two provinces fully equipped for war. To attack me, the rights of the magistrates have been tampered with, so that, instead of governors being sent out immediately after being praetors and consuls, as has always happened, they are now approved and elected by a small clique. To attack me, the plea of age has been disregarded, and men who have already done good service in earlier wars have been called out again to command troops. I alone have been denied the right always accorded to all commanders - that is, the right of coming home, after successful campaigns, with some honor, or at least without disgrace, and disbanding one's army. None the less, I have borne all of this patiently, and I shall go on doing so; nor do I intend in the present instance to take your army and keep it myself - although I could do that perfectly easily - but merely to see to it that you will not have an army to use against me. This is my one and final condition for peace."

I love everything about that speech. I love how Caesar starts out saying that no one in the whole army has less rights to complaints and self-pity than you. The way he contrasts the behavior of himself, his army, and the Pompeian army with that of Petreius and Afranius. The way he builds momentum and rams home his point by repeatedly saying that you, meaning Afranius and Petreius, are to blame, you alone. Then, of course, he launches into the part where he repeatedly starts his sentences with, “to attack me”.

In doing so, he hammers in the idea that all of these things he lists, these unprecedented actions on the part of Pompey and the Optimates, were all done with the aim of crushing one man, Julius Caesar. He drives home the point that his enemies are motivated, are animated, by personal hatred. In his eyes, this is a case of the entire resources of the state being hijacked to pursue the vendetta of a small click. A small click which he calls out in the course of his speech.

You need no reminder by now, but that click is the Optimates, now led militarily by Pompey. Pompey is also called out when he speaks of a command having been created where a man can govern two provinces while sitting outside the gates of Rome and simultaneously running Rome. Essentially, Caesar is making the point that this is not the normal application of law. Instead, the state has been taken over by this click and it is going to extraordinary lengths to strike at him personally.

Finally, Caesar closes his speech with his grand magnanimous act of clemency. He says that he has borne all of these wrongs done to him with patience and will continue to do so. He will not be a Sulla or a Marius. And so, far from putting his enemies to death or seizing their property, his one and only condition for peace is that Afranius and Petreius give up their army and disband it. He won't even press their troops into his service. Caesar tells us when he finished this speech that Pompeian troops, who had been listening to all of this, were delighted.

Caesar says they were delighted because, rather than receiving the punishment they expected and deserved, he adds, they would instead actually be rewarded with a free discharge without even having to ask. Talks between Caesar and Afranius and Petreius continue as they iron out some of the details. When the negotiations come to when and where the discharge should take place, the Pompeian soldiers standing on the rampart begin to shout and gesture, indicating, according to Caesar, that they wanted immediate demobilization. Caesar says they did not trust Afranius and Petreius to keep their words, no matter what promises they made Caesar. Essentially, the Pompeian troops are saying, if you don't discharge us right away, right here and now, if you give Afranius and Petreius extra time, they will not keep their word.

We only have Caesar's account of this, but there would have been many upper class Roman witnesses all writing about this to friends and family. It's unlikely Caesar could get away with complete fabrications. And so, if Caesar is telling the truth about this, what a damning accusation against Afranius and Petreius coming from their own men.
After this outburst from the Pompeian troops, Caesar tells us there was a brief argument between himself, Afranius, and Petreius before they finally come to an agreement. The Pompeian soldiers with homes in Spain will be discharged at once.

The rest of the soldiers will be marched to the River Var, the border between Gaul and Italy, not far from the modern French-Italian border. Caesar for his part promises there will be no retribution by his side and that no man will be forced to take a military oath to Caesar against his will. He also promises to feed the Pompeians, starting immediately, and to continue to do so until the army reached the River Var. Caesar then makes quite a wild promise that I can't imagine was too popular with his own troops. He promises that any property his soldiers have seized from the Pompeians over the course of the war will be reimbursed to the Pompeians, meaning he will compensate the Pompeians for all property lost while fighting against him.

So he has the Pompeians make what he calls a fair evaluation of this property and pays them in cash equivalent. I don't have to tell you how crazy that is in the context of ancient war. After these terms are agreed upon, Caesar tells us that, spontaneously, the Pompeian soldiers started bringing all of their disputes to him for judgment. I guess he had impressed them with his liberality and fairness during the negotiations. They also don't seem to trust Afranius and Petreius.

In fact, at one point, the Pompeian soldiers come very close to mounting a mutiny when they start to demand their pay and Afranius and Petreius tell them no because it's not yet payday. The Pompeian soldiers then demand that the case be brought before Caesar so that he can investigate the matter. Both sides agree to this, though Caesar doesn't tell us what the outcome was. But it does give us a glimpse into just how many headaches Caesar has to deal with on a daily basis. And so, with the peace negotiated, Caesar, efficient as ever, disbands all of the soldiers with Spanish homes, about a third of the army, over the next two days.

He then orders two of his own legions to march ahead and lead the way and the Pompeians to follow behind. The armies duly march all the way to the Var and there the Pompeians are discharged. As for Afranius and Petreius, after receiving Caesar's clemency, they go to join Pompey. There they will immediately rejoin the fight against Caesar. And speaking of Caesar's clemency, I want to dive deep on that for a moment.

We've mentioned Caesar's clemency many times before in this podcast, but I don't think we've ever gone into full detail on all of its facets. That's because I was waiting for this moment. This act of clemency towards Afranius, Petreius, and their armies is one of the most dramatic of the Civil War. We've seen Caesar show clemency or mercy as far back as when he slit the pirates' throats before crucifying them, back when he was a young man. And we've seen various acts of clemency demonstrated in the Gallic Wars.

But it is here in the Civil War that Caesar's clemency really hits its stride. We saw this already at the Siege of Corfinium, and we've seen it again now with the surrender of the Spanish Legions. And this makes sense. The enemies Caesar now faces are not foreign barbarians, but fellow Roman citizens. Naturally he will see these people as being more worthy of clemency.

Caesar doesn't want to see his countrymen die, and he really doesn't want to be the one killing them. So these dramatic acts of clemency allow him to simultaneously spare their lives and to demonstrate to the Roman world how morally superior he is to the Optimates and to Pompey. They allow him to demonstrate that he is a more merciful person who cares more for his countrymen than they do. They also allow him to avoid making martyrs of his enemies. After crossing the Rubicon, Caesar is never going to have the moral high ground in his dispute with his fellow Romans, but what he can do is show, through his conduct in prosecuting the war, that he is really the good side.

In other words, if you are a neutral Roman who sympathizes more with Pompey and the Optimates, but you see them behaving atrociously towards fellow citizens, while Caesar treats them like gold, you may begin to wonder if Pompey and the Optimates really do have the moral high ground. Or, at the very least, it may prevent you from going to join their side, whereas your decision might be much easier if you think Caesar is wrong and you see him killing citizens and seizing their property. But of course, Caesar is a very complex and at times enigmatic man. And this description of his clemency only scratches the surface of all that is going on here. Caesar's clemency isn't just an example of him being a moral person in the context of the ancient world.

It isn't just a way to win over his fellow citizens to his side. You'll sometimes see Caesar's clemency characterized as a sort of psychological game he plays with his enemies. To understand this game, you have to understand the Roman culture it plays out in. You see, clemency, or rather its Latin root, ‘clementia’, had a very specific connotation to the Romans. Clemency was typically the prerogative of kings.

Clemency is something a monarch shows to a disobedient subject. Clemency is something a Roman magistrate might show to a non-citizen subject or a criminal. Clemency is not something one Roman citizen shows to another, even less so one aristocrat to another. To show clemency to another person inherently meant you were superior to them. After all, as historian Mary Beard puts it, ‘only those with the power to do otherwise can exercise mercy.’

Classicist Melissa Barden Dowling writes in her book ‘Clemency and Cruelty in the Roman World’, “Clemency remains a quality connected to guilt and its acknowledgment, requiring the abasement of the suppliant before his pardoner, and a recognition both of the obligation conferred upon the man pardoned and of the increased status of the man who spares."

In the world of the Roman aristocracy, where a certain egalitarianism among the upper class is at least aspired to, and where the word rex or king is a hated and feared term, these shows of king-like clemency don't necessarily go down well. And Caesar knows this. This is why in the commentaries he generally avoids using the term Clementia. But make no mistake, just because he avoids using the word doesn't mean that isn't exactly what he's doing. After all, Caesar will one day allow a temple to be built dedicated to his clemency.

And there are other, even more important elements to this supposed mind game as well. You see, the Romans were an extremely martial people with an honor culture, especially among the upper class. And when defeated in battle, there was a sort of ethos that a Roman commander should do one of two things, die fighting or commit suicide. Either one would help him to regain his honor, and would act as an example to his countrymen and future generations. And normally, the enemy leaves you no choice.

If you are captured by a foreign enemy, you may very well be tortured or shamed in some way. Remember what the Parthians had done with Crassus' head when they had received it? They used it as a prop in a play. And if they had captured him alive, perhaps it would have been the real Crassus being paraded through cities in a farce of a Roman triumph rather than his doppelganger.

And Roman civil wars aren't much different. They too don't leave the vanquished with much of an option. It may seem quite strange to us, but historian Christian Meyer, in his book ‘Caesar’ writes, “Sulla's murders, while spreading terror, also involved respect. They were committed among equals, even if from the position of the victor. To this extent they were in accordance with ancient aristocratic thinking in terms of friend and foe, if one wanted to practice it in true archaic fashion.”

So even Sulla’s murders, while being brutal and spreading terror, still followed a certain code and forced his opponents to take the “honorable way out”, even if that was just becoming a martyr at the hands of the enemy. So simply put, the enemy, whether domestic or foreign, typically gave you no choice but to take the honorable way out.

But then, along comes Julius Caesar. He defeats you, outmaneuvers you in a bloodless campaign, and gets your troops to turn on you, as he did at both Corfinium and here again in Spain. And then, suddenly, he reaches out this insidious hand of clemency. In fact, Cicero actually calls it insidious clemency. You know what the honorable thing to do is, suicide or death in battle. But here's Caesar offering a third way out, his clemency. And you know it's dishonorable to accept his clemency. You know it brings shame on you and your family. You know it places Caesar in the position of superior, sovereign even. You know if you accept, you will owe Caesar your life. And thus you know you should reject his clemency.

But the self-preservation instinct is strong. It's a very difficult instinct to override. And so, again and again, men accept Caesar's clemency, rather than taking the honorable way out. And this has to create feelings of deep self-loathing, because he maneuvered you into being a participant in this dishonorable act of clemency. You are an accomplice, you are culpable, you are guilty. This isn't just something that happened to you, you took an active part in it. He can offer clemency all he likes, but at the end of the day, you decide whether to accept it, and you did. You were shamefully defeated by him, and then you even more shamefully accepted his clemency.

And so, I think many of these men did what people often do with feelings of self-loathing. They try to project them outward. You don't have to blame yourself and feel so much shame if you just place all the blame on Caesar. Just turn all that self-loathing into hatred for Caesar.

And Caesar is a Roman aristocrat, a patrician. He is well aware of the cultural norms of his own people. And so, as I said, the case is sometimes made that this is a sort of mind game and power game he plays with his enemies. Force them to shame themselves. Force them to participate in that shameful act. Force them to place Caesar in a superior monarch-like position. Rub their faces in the fact that you are better than them, just like he used to do when he would sleep with senators' wives. And just like when Caesar chose to sleep with other senators' wives rather than women of lower class, much of this is about proving dominance. Or at least, that is one argument.

That at best, Caesar's clemency was a political expedient with clear political objectives in mind. And at worst, it was a sort of mind game he played to humiliate and dominate his opponents. For example, historian Christian Meyer writes that Montesquieu, the French political philosopher, found Caesar's clemency insulting. He quotes Montesquieu as saying, "One saw that he did not forgive, but merely disdained to punish." Meaning Caesar did not forgive people so much as disdain to punish them. I think that's overly harsh and even kind of nonsensical when you look at the level of forgiveness Caesar will exhibit in his acts of clemency, even offering high political office to men who had fought against him, such as Brutus, who he indeed forgave and felt great fondness, even love for.

And it isn't just me who disagrees with Montesquieu. Meyer also quotes Frederick the Great's comment on Montesquieu's opinion as, "This reflection is exaggerated! If all human actions are judged with such severity, there is no longer any room for a heroic deed."

So yes, there has long been debate or controversy surrounding Caesar's clemency, going all the way back to Caesar's day and all the centuries since then, and they still persist today. In my research, I came across an entire thesis written solely on Caesar's clemency.

Well, I don't claim to have the final answer to these debates, but as someone who has been eyeballed deep in the life of Julius Caesar for a few years now, I can offer you my opinion. I think Caesar's clemency sprung from his personality, an earnest desire he had not to be cruel in the context of the ancient world. After all, the examples of him displaying clemency far predate the Civil War. Caesar was showing clemency long before there was a body of neutrals sitting on the sidelines of a civil war that he wanted to win over. I think Caesar hated the idea of killing fellow Romans.

I think this abhorrence of the punitive killing of political enemies dates back to his youth and the horror he witnessed when Marius and Sulla and Cinna butchered each other's supporters. Caesar after all would have seen heads on the rostra and proscription lists in the forum. His cousin young Marius was one of these heads. Caesar himself had to go on the run from death squads. This all had to make a profound impact on his young mind.

And many people would use such violence as justification to commit similar acts of violence themselves. But as we saw way back when Caesar refused to prosecute the captain of the death squad which had hunted him, Caesar has always shown that he wanted to do the exact opposite. That the influence these events had on his life were to make him rebuke violent vendettas and instead to seek reconciliation with political opponents. The ancient sources are filled with anecdotes where Caesar gladly comes to terms with political enemies given just half a chance.

I think the political expediency element of it then flows from Caesar being such a political animal. Whatever strategy he set his mind to, he was always going to try to make maximum use of that strategy politically. So clemency is his chosen course based on his personality. Well, what's the best way to get the most out of such a policy politically? Use it for propaganda of course. And Caesar is far too savvy a political operator for that not to be obvious to him.

And for those who argue that Caesar cared nothing for the Roman people and that he just saw clemency as the most expedient way for him to win the civil war and gain power, I would reply as follows. If Caesar is just an amoral sociopath looking for the most effective and surefire way to win the war and seize power, then why not imitate Sulla? After all, we saw back in episode 68 in a letter from Caesar that he felt Sulla's strategy had been effective. He wrote that, through their cruelty, others had been unable to escape hatred or make their victory lasting, save for Lucius Sulla, and I do not intend to imitate him.

So yes, he argues that cruelty was a detriment to other men who waged civil war. I imagine he means Marius and Cinna. But he also lists Sulla as the exception, a man who showed so much cruelty, it worked. So if Caesar believes Sulla was able to establish a lasting victory through his cruelty, and if Caesar is just an amoral sociopath looking to win, then surely he would just have followed the roadmap of the man who won the last civil war. But he doesn't. Despite Sulla having been victorious, Caesar declares that he does not intend to imitate him, nor does he.

So all of that being said, where do the mind games of it all fit into this? Well, I think those existed too. However, I think they were a byproduct or side effect of clemency rather than the actual goal of clemency. I find the idea that Caesar engaged in this radical policy of sparing his opponents and letting them and their armies live just to humiliate them ridiculous. What would that gain him other than personal satisfaction?

And if all he's after is personal satisfaction, then why not just kill them? After all, if they captured Caesar, they would certainly kill him. But all of that doesn't mean Caesar didn't enjoy their humiliation, that he didn't enjoy dominating them and placing himself in the position of superior, both in terms of power and morals. I think he absolutely was aware of and enjoyed all of these facets of clemency, but I think they were just nice extra perks rather than a reason to show clemency. In other words, I think Caesar showed clemency to his defeated foes because he wanted to avoid killing his countrymen, because he wanted to avoid being another Sulla.

I think he used this clemency as a potent piece of political propaganda that allowed him to seize the moral high ground and win over the fence-sitters and the greater populace. The fact that he also got to dominate and humiliate his foes while making them look petty and ungrateful, that was just icing on the cake. Just some of the perks of the chosen policy. But that's all just my opinion, and you're entitled to your own. In fact, I'd love to hear your thoughts.
So if you're listening on a platform that allows you to leave a comment, comment your thoughts on his clemency. You don't have to write an essay or anything, just leave a few words. And if you're on a platform that doesn't allow comments, you can always leave a comment on social media on the post for this episode.

And that is where our narrative ends today, along with the first Spanish campaign of the Civil War. A campaign that Caesar won, by the way, in only 40 days, and that is after winning the Italian campaign in less than two months. So that's two campaigns down and many more to go.

In our next episode, Caesar moves on to further Spain and consolidates his power in that province. Meanwhile, Gaius Antony, younger brother of Mark Antony, and Dolabella, son-in-law to Cicero, suffer crushing defeats while attempting to defend Illyricum, the modern Balkans, on Caesar's behalf. A defense which ends very tragically and very bloodily.
Thank you all for listening. This has been a longer episode than usual, so I'll be quick with the shoutouts today, and then have a short little ending anecdote regarding Caesar's clemency.

Our first five-star review today is from WTC100 on Apple Podcasts. His or her title is “Fascinating History”. They then write, “Great to hear the personal aspects of the Romans, their personalities, interactions, relationships. Really brings history to life, not just dates that in school.”

I love to hear that you appreciate the focus on personalities and relationships of the Roman world in this podcast. I really do think that it is taking these stories and making them human that turns the Romans from cold, distant figures made of marble and transforms them into living, breathing humans with emotions. Thank you for the kind review!
Our second five-star review is from Adam on Podcast Republic. Adam writes, “I'm really enjoying this podcast so far. Passionate host who expounds on the most enigmatic, fascinating figure in ancient Rome. Binge listening this.”

Thank you so much for the wonderful review, Adam. I'm guilty as charged on the passion, and we've just spent this whole episode expounding on the enigmatic clemency of Julius Caesar, so I'd say you're spot on on that front as well. I hope you're enjoying binge listening and losing yourself in the life of Julius Caesar in the world of ancient Rome.

Now on to our patrons on Patreon. This episode, we have two new patrons, so let me give you a warm welcome to Jared and Timothy, who have joined our Roman army as patrons of the March of History. I thank you both for your support of the March of History, and this podcast would not be possible without your help and without your generosity. So now all of our patrons together are Mark, Liga, Laurie, Scott, Peggy, Care, Desert Legionnaire, Vish, and now Jared and Timothy.Thank you all for your help.

And now for our ending story. Plutarch tells us a short story about Caesar that occurred sometime during or just after the Gallic Wars. Like many anecdotes given by Plutarch and Suetonius, it lacks a clear date on the timeline. Because of that, I never did mention it during our episodes on the Gallic Wars. But it is a story that displays some of Caesar's clemency or mildness towards his foes, so I figured I'd tell it to you today.

Anyway, the story goes like this. One day, Caesar and some of his friends are visiting a temple of the Averni. The Averni, you'll remember, are the tribe of Vercingetorix. At this temple, Caesar and his friends come across a short sword hanging up.

They are told that this sword belonged to and was taken from Julius Caesar, the implication being that they bested him in some battle or skirmish, disarmed him, took his sword, and hung it up in this temple. But when Caesar sees this sword, his only reaction is to smile. His friends, though, are quite bothered by this sword, and they tell Caesar he should have it taken down. Caesar, however, refuses, telling them he looks upon the sword as sacred.

So there you have it. A story of Julius Caesar showing clemency, mildness, mercy, and massive egotism all wrapped into one. He didn't rip the sword down from its place of honor in petulant anger. He didn't punish the Averni for their impudence. Instead, he left the sword right where it was, both as a magnanimous gesture to show he was the bigger man, and because what greater ego boost could he hope for than that the Averni thought so highly of him that they enshrined his sword in a sacred temple?

And that is all for today. I'm your host, Trevor Fernes. Thank you all for listening. Keep on sharing the podcast with everyone you know, and I will talk to you in the next episode of The March of History.